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NOTES
DON'T HATE ME BECAUSE I'M
BEAUTIFUL.. .AND
INTELLIGENT.. .AND ATHLETIC:
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN
GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL
ANALYSIS
Skylar A. Sherwoodt
I. INTRODUCTION
REGULATION OF GENETIC ENHANCEMENT im-
plicates several fundamental rights and interests of the parties
involved: the parents, the state, and the pre-embryo. This Note
asserts that while abortion law already provides a framework by
which the courts can jockey the interests and rights of these
parties, the model is not appropriate for application to future
cases of genetic enhancement.
The Human Genome Project is a worldwide effort to de-
code the human genome. 1 Information recently released re-
garding Project completion has yielded unprecedented solutions
and problems. The result is that we face the double-edged sword
of genetic engineering that promises to cure disease, yet has the
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2001; B.S., Univer-
sity of Washington, 1997.
1 See Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human Genome, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 579, 579-80 (1991) (describing genome projects underway in the United
States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, Japan, France, and the European Communi-
ties).
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potential for great abuse in the form of the enhancement of a
future child's already normal characteristics. Such utilization is
an abuse as it poses threats to society's notions of equality and
fairness as well as the ability to make our own decisions about
changes to our person.2 This abuse is likely to be regulated,
raising the concern that a law regulating genetic enhancement
would violate several fundamental rights under the Constitution.
This Note focuses on two of those rights. The first, familiar to
the law, is parents' rights to make decisions on behalf of chil-
dren. The second, the right to customize the product of procrea-
tion (a right to genetically engineer one's children), is one that
currently has a place only in theory, and if found to exist by the
Supreme Court, may become a reality when genetic engineering
technology can be practically applied. As fundamental, these
rights will be granted the highest constitutional protection. A
law controverting such a right can be upheld as constitutional
only if it satisfies strict scrutiny, that is, the law must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.' In the
case of genetic enhancement, the state may be able to limit
these rights by reason of children's welfare and general interests
in cultural and genetic diversity.
Yet, state interests in children's welfare and cultural and
genetic diversity can only limit the fundamental rights of pa-
rental decision-making and choosing to genetically engineer
their children if compelling. The abortion model is inappropri-
ate for this determination because it evaluates the right not to
procreate4 which is different from the right to customize one's
offspring. Abortion law primarily balances state interests in the
fetus and the health of the mother against a woman's right to
procreate. It is entirely dependent on viability as the marker for
when the state's interest in the fetus becomes compelling be-
cause here, the fetus has a chance for life outside the womb.
Inherent in the analysis is that there is a question of whether or
not there will be a child. A case of genetic engineering never
contemplates this question. Rather, the parents are choosing to
2 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671, 673-74 (1999).
3 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (finding state law prohibiting
abortions unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (declaring
a regulation restricting the distribution of contraceptives unconstitutional).
4 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
S Se id.
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engineer their child because it is their plan to carry the child to
term. Further, if viability is the harbinger of compelling inter-
ests, the right of the parents to genetically engineer their child
goes unchecked. Genetic engineering takes place at the pre-
embryo stage, long before viability. In effect, the interests of
the state are not served if they can only be found compelling at
viability. Consequently, the point is moot. Since viability is not
at issue for a genetically engineered fetus and the harm (in the
form of genetic manipulation) occurs long before that point, vi-
ability is not an appropriate marker to gauge the point at which
state interests become compelling in the genetic engineering
context. It follows then, that the abortion model, with its reli-
ance on viability, cannot be applied to a suit challenging a
regulation of genetic enhancement.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
A. The Natural Way: Sexual Reproduction
and Genetic Recombination
With the exception of sex cells, each person possesses a total of
23 pairs of chromosomes, which are present in the nuclei of all
human cells.6 These chromosomes are composed of deoxyribo-
nucleic acid (DNA), which in turn is made up of four bases
called nucleotides. 7 Our genes are short sections of DNA, each
gene having a "specific influence on the workings of a cell."8
Features such as hair color or metabolism of substances are the
result of the same gene acting in many different cells.9 Every
human cell contains over 100,000 different genes that act in
concert with others, or independently, to create proteins to be
used by our body to develop and function throughout life.' 0
In anticipation of the process of cell division called mitosis,
the chromosomes replicate so that when the division occurs, the
newly formed cells have the original 23 pairs.1' The DNA in the
new cells is identical to that of the original cell. The process is
somewhat different with gametes, or sex cells, when they un-
6 See AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, 478-79 (Charles
B. Clayman ed., 1989).
7 See id. at 478, 480.
8Id. at 478.
9 See id.
'0 See id. at 478-80.
" See id. at 673.
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dergo their division, called meiosis. 12 Eggs and sperm only
contain one set of 23 chromosomes so that the full 46 is created
upon the union of egg and sperm. Thus, when gametes divide,
each new cell does not contain an exact replica of the DNA in
the original egg or sperm. Instead, a random shuffling of genetic
information occurs between the 23 chromosomes so that each
subsequent gamete is genetically different from the last. 13 Then,
at fertilization, a unique egg combines with a unique sperm to
create an individual possessing a genome that has never before
existed. It is from this process of recombination upon which the
great diversity of our species depends.
B. Genetic Engineering/Enhancement
Science promises to make the manipulation of someone's
genome a real possibility. The ramifications are such that par-
ents may soon be able to specify exactly which features they
want their child to have, before the child reaches the 16-cell
stage. This technique, called recombinant DNA technology, is
the mechanism of this manipulation. The techniques that alter
DNA to achieve some desired change in characteristics are col-
lectively called genetic engineering.14 The first step in this pro-
cess is to identify the desired gene in a donor. The second step
is to synthesize this gene artificially. Once done, this gene is
removed from the cell and introduced into a recipient cell where
enzymes have excised a corresponding gap into which the donor
DNA can be spliced.15
This technique, of course, has reputable uses for the curing
or treatment of disease. But can the same be said for its poten-
tial for enhancing what is already present in what most would
consider normal form? Is the creation of children, for instance,
who are tailor-made to be smarter than average, taller than av-
erage, perhaps better looking than average, a reputable use of
such an important medical technique? Is this an abuse of legiti-
mate and noble science to turn what is intended for the preven-
tion of disease into something of a luxury? Do we, in the name
of medicine, allow the abuses to stand so as to offer the most
effective treatment to those who require it? For the purposes of
12 See id.
"s See id. at 672.
14 See id. at 484.
15 See id.
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this Note, such superfluous use of recombinant DNA technol-
ogy is an abuse of its benefits. Further, I have drafted a model
statute that attempts to limit the use of genetic engineering for
the prevention and treatment of those diseases or conditions that
have no known cure. But what will constitute the abuses?
Professor Maxwell Mehlman has raised two questions in
defining "enhancement."' 16 The first involves determining
whether an enhancement is genetic. 17 The second considers
when one can categorize genetic manipulation as "enhance-
ment."18 I will adopt Professor Mehlman's arguments that an
enhancement is genetic when it comes about through gene
splicing or recombinant DNA technology and a genetic ma-
nipulation is enhancement when the alteration is for purposes of
"improving a characteristic that ... would be within what is
generally regarded as a 'normal' range, or [as] installing a char-
acteristic that would not normally be present."' 19
II. A MODEL STATUTE REGULATING GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT
§ 1. Provisions:
No health care facility, fertility clinic, physician, research facil-
ity, or other health care provider shall enter, through the use of
recombinant DNA technology, the genetic structure or sequence
of a human pre-embryo except for purposes of eliminating or
significantly reducing, within medical reason, the likelihood of
disease for the resultant individual.
§ 2. Punishment For Violation:
Violators of this statute are subject to civil penalties not to ex-
ceed $200,000 for first offenses or $500,000 for each subse-
quent offense.
In addition to civil penalties, the court may order any other
remedies the court deems appropriate, including criminal liabil-
ity, as the Attorney General deems appropriate.
16 See Mehiman, supra note 2, at 674.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 Id. at 675 (citations omitted).
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§ 3. Definitions:
The term "Recombinant DNA technique" means:
20
The incorporation of natural or synthetic DNA into the
genome of a human pre-embryo in a way that perma-
nently changes that pre-embryo's naturally occurring
genetic code.
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN GENETIC ENGINEERING
The genetic enhancement of a pre-embryo is about to be-
come a reality. Scientists, politicians, theologians, and lawyers
have begun to debate whether this type of technology should be
allowed on human pre-embryos. This debate will undoubtedly
spill into the legislative arena where Congress may be moved to
regulate this practice of genetic enhancement technology. In the
creation of a federal statute, consideration and deference must
be given to constitutionally protected rights. Should this statute
be challenged for an alleged violation of one's fundamental
rights under the Constitution, courts will review the law under
its most stringent standard: strict scrutiny. Constitutional rights
are so highly regarded under the law that only the most compel-
ling intentions will suffice to justify an encroachment upon
them. The hallmarks of strict scrutiny and the factors that a
court will require in order for the statute to be upheld as con-
stitutional are that the contravening regulation be narrowly tai-
lored to achieving a compelling state interest.21 A law regulat-
ing the genetic engineering of human pre-embryos will, in all
likelihood, be challenged on constitutional grounds. The chal-
lenge will be to identify the fundamental rights of parents that
are implicated by the law.
Since genetic enhancement revolves around private and
personal choices in conducting one's life according to one's
wishes, the logical legal starting point for constitutional analy-
sis is the guarantee of personal privacy long established by the
20 This language was adopted from a definition of recombinant DNA mole-
cules. See Office of Biotechnology Activities, National Institute of Health, NIH
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, § I-B (visited Apr.
18,2001) <http:ll www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines/guidejanO l.htm>.
21 See cases cited supra note 3.
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Supreme Court.2 2 The origins of this constitutional guarantee
have been found in the First,23 Fourth,24 and Fifth Amend-
ments, as well as in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,26 the
Ninth Amendment,27 and the liberty concept in the first portion
of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Most importantly, the Court
has deemed the rights secured by this guarantee to privacy as
fundamental.29
Twentieth century cases have augmented the list of rights
included in the right to privacy. In a 1942 case, Skinner v.
Oklahoma,30 the Supreme Court derived the right to procreate
from the guarantee of privacy, and thereby holding it to be fun-
damental. Subsequent cases pertaining to laws limiting indi-
viduals' reproductive decisions allowed the Court to find a fun-
damental right to not procreate. The seminal case in that regard
is Roe v. Wade,3' which struck down as unconstitutional a Texas
statute criminalizing abortion. The statute was challenged on
the basis of its violation of the right to privacy32 protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
33
Genetic enhancement presents parents with the unprece-
dented ability to choose the traits of their children. As this
22 See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (affirming
circuit court's decision that it had no legal right or power to grant the defendant's
motion requiring plaintiff to submit to a "surgical examination" without her consent).
2 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (discussing the right to be free
from government intrusions by striking down a Georgia law making private posses-
sion of obscene materials a crime).24 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stating that inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment focuses on "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's security").
2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1968) (stating that, even though the Constitution does not explicitly mention a
right toprivacy, the Court has recognized that right though the Bill of Rights).
6 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Con-
necticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital pri-
vacy).
27 See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
28 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down Nebraska law
that prohibited the teachings of languages, other than English, in any private, de-
nominational, parochial, or public school).
29 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
30 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding state law providing for sterilization of "habit-
ual criminals" unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
3' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32 See id. at 121.
33 See id. at 152.
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choice has never before been possible, the Court has had no op-
portunity to address whether parents have a fundamental right to
exercise it. The existing fundamental rights surrounding repro-
ductive options, namely, the right to procreate and the right not
to procreate do not effectively capture the performance of this
choice. Choosing to genetically engineer one's child involves
the question of whether there is a right to genetically enhance,
not whether one will have a child.
Both the Skinner and Roe opinions concluded that the
rights of procreation are fundamental. These conclusions are
supported within by a description of the ramifications to the in-
dividual or society if this were not so.3 4 However, neither case
provides much guidance as to the Court's rationale in ascer-
taining the fundamental nature of the rights to procreate and not
procreate. The court often turns to the holding in Griswold v.
Connecticut that established the "zones of privacy" that ema-
nate from the Bill of Rights35 as support for the finding of a
fundamental right. The right to marry,36 to custody of one's37 ,38
children, to control the ugbringing of one's children, to pro-
create,3 9 to not procreate, to control reproduction4 ---each es-
tablished fundamental right relies in part on the principal that
there are certain areas of such personal nature into which un-
warranted governmental intrusion is improper; that each has
been so engrained in our nation's history that they will not eas-
ily be restricted.
34 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
35 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
36 The leading case on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967), in which the Court invalidated a Virginia statute outlawing interracial mar-
riage based on the broad reasoning that freedom to marry is fundamental.37 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982).
38 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding Oregon law
requiring children to attend public schools unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing a constitutional right for the Amish to exempt their
14 and 15 year-old children from the state's compulsory school attendance law). See
generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding the right to "bring
up children" within the boundaries of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).39 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-43.
40 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-55; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (affirming Roe v. Wade's essential holding of women's right to an abortion).
41 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right to
purchase and use contraceptives); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(holding the fundamental right to purchase and use contraceptives extends to unmar-
ried persons).
[Vol. 11:633
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Choosing the features of our children has not been en-
grained in our nation's history or traditions. Therefore, one
might argue that there would be little foundation on which to
base a fundamental right to genetically engineer children. How-
ever, the same could be said about life-saving treatments. The
framers of the Constitution could not fathom our current ability
to maintain someone indefinitely. Nevertheless, the Court went
on to find a fundamental right to refuse such treatment in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,42 founded
on theories of "physical freedom" and "self-determination."
43
Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence that "state incur-
sions into the body [are] repugnant to the interests protected by
the Due Process Clause."44 Likewise, to find that a right to ge-
netically customize offspring is fundamental, we must look be-
yond what the right asserts on its face to the underlying values
upon which it is based.
Like various fundamental rights mentioned above, a zone
of privacy encompasses choosing to customize one's children. It
is closely linked to the right to procreate-a right whose con-
stitutional value was recognized in 1942.45 As is the exercise of
one's right to procreate, the decision to customize a child is
highly personal to the parents as it is dependent on, and influ-
enced, by their individual moral and ethical tenets. By the same
reasoning, the Court has held the raising of one's children to be
constitutionally protected.46 By analogy on the basis of the de-
gree of privacy, the same constitutional protection would be
warranted for genetically engineering one's children that is
given other rights revolving around the family (such as the
raising of children or the right to procreate/not procreate). It is
critical to bear in mind, however, that constitutional protection
is not absolute.
Traditionally, courts distance themselves from matters re-
lating to the family dynamic. Constitutional protection extends
42 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41 Id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the scope of a pro-
tected liberty interest).
44Id. at 287.45 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-43.
46 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding Ore-
gon law that required children to attend public schools "unreasonably interfere[d]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control").
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to the right to marry,47 the right to raise and educate one's chil-
dren, and the right to custody of one's children.48 Parental
authority to make decisions on behalf of their children has also
enjoyed long-standing privilege in the eyes of the law.49 Gener-
ally, it is presumed that children are unable to rationally evalu-
ate the ramifications of their decisions and to reason what is
best for themselves. 50 However, as broad as parental authority
is, it can be limited by the state's parens patriae power, where
the state acts to protect the interests of the child, which are dis-
cussed below.5 1 The Supreme Court has made clear, in its dis-
cussions of parens patriae, that parents may be free to become
martyrs; but it does not follow that parents are free to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
majority when they can make that choice for themselves. 52
Such limitation on parental decision-making rights is fre-
quently at issue on the medical front, where the state can com-
pel medical treatment to save the life of a child when the par-
ents refuse. Typically, conflicts between the state and parents
arise when the parents refuse medical treatment on behalf of the
child in the name of religion. One such situation arose in a New
York court where the court overrode the wishes of a boy who
was not yet 18-years-old, as well as those of his parents, and
ordered blood transfusions be given during the course of the
boy's chemotherapy. 53 In weeks, the boy would have been 18-
years-old, and the court reasoned, he would then be able to de-
cide his future.54 Reiterated in this case is the legal truism that
47 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).48 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
49 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (finding the right to "bring up children" within the boundaries of the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The
Proper Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB.
POL'Y 423, 438-39 (1993) (summarizing other works that show children may lack the
ability to analyze crucial concepts in decision-making); see also Julie Holland,
Should Parents Be Permitted to Authorize Genetic Testing for Their Children?, 31
FAM. L.Q. 321, 329 (1997) (arguing that parents should not be able to authorize con-
sent on behalf of their minor children for untreatable or late onset genetic tests).
51 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding the
state, as parens patriae, may restrict parent's control and this power is not nullified
merely because the parent defends on the basis of his or her exercise of constitutional
rights). 52 See id.53 See In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
5 4 See id. at 243 n.15.
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while fundamental rights are granted the highest possible re-
spect under the law, none is beyond limitation. When the ability
to genetically engineer children is realized, the state may be
able to limit parents' right to make decisions for their child
when the child's welfare is at stake.
While the state would have a compelling interest where the
child's welfare is concerned, it is not clear whether the contra-
vening parental right extends to the genetic enhancement of
children. The manner in which medicine is currently practiced
is consistent with the unease regarding parents' unbridled dis-
cretion in genetically enhancing their child. Citizens of the age
of majority are not privileged to receive any and every treat-
ment they perceive to be necessary to treat their ailments. Phy-
sicians are not required to prescribe drugs the patient deems ap-
propriate. Rather, the physician first examines the patient to
determine what drugs or therapies are medically necessary for
the health of the patient, adhering to the accepted standard of
care.55 It would seem that parents would not be able to demand
and have a right to any and every treatment for their child. Yet,
there is a void of case law specifically addressing parental
rights in terms of unnecessary treatments, therapies, or surger-
ies. It is therefore unclear whether parents' right to make medi-
cal decisions for their children extends as far as making deci-
sions to alter their children's genomes for non-therapeutic rea-
sons.
Further, physicians are reluctant to provide treatment or
tests for patients when there is no medical justification for do-
ing so. 56 Such is the case when parents demand their children be
tested for genetic conditions, such as Huntington's disease, that
have no known cure or effective treatment.57 Doctors would
55 See, e.g., Centennial Peaks Behavioral Health Sys., 9 P.3d 1168, 1173
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding "[t]o prevail on a claim of professional negligence
against a physician or other trained medical professional, a plaintiff must establish
that the professional failed to conform to the standard of care ordinarily possessed
and exercised by members of the same school of medicine practiced by that defen-
dant"); Tracz ex rel. Tracz v. Charter Bryan v. Burt, 486 S.E.2d 536, 539 (Va. 1997)
("a physician must demonstrate that degree of skill and diligence in the diagnosis and
treatment of the patient which is employed by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the
physician's field of practice or specialty"); Shellenbarger v. Brigman, 3 P.3d 211, 215
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Washington statute requiring a medical negligence
action to establish physician did not adhere to the accepted standard of care).56
.See Holland, supra note 50, at 321.57 See Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents:
Who Decides?, 272 JAMA 875 (1994).
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prefer to postpone the test until the child is no longer a minor
and can make the decision for herself, especially when the re-
sult of such test would have life-long ramifications for the child.
One concern is that some parents desire these genetic diagnoses
for their children for purely self-serving purposes. Perhaps the
parent carries the gene for Huntington's disease and simply
wants her child tested to assuage her concerns that she has
passed on the deadly gene. With deference given to both the
medical profession and legal precedents, the law may be willing
to override parental decisions made on behalf of their children
when the requested procedure or treatment is not medically nec-
essary and when the benefit to be gained by the child will not
significantly depreciate if the procedure is postponed until the
child reaches the age of majority, and then can decide for her-
self. This should be the case with the genetic enhancement of
children for reasons other than the treatment of incurable or un-
treatable disease. If courts agree, states' exercise of parens pa-
triae will effectively limit the parental authority to make deci-
sions on behalf of their children.
In situations where the parent's decision will irreparably
perpetuate throughout the child's life, children's rights activists
advocate limiting parental authority and erring on the side of
caution.58 Likewise, this Note advocates the use of caution when
approaching the genetic enhancement of pre-embryos for rea-
sons other than the treatment of incurable or untreatable disease.
The ideal approach would be to delay the application of this
new technology to humans until it has developed to the point
where it is possible to genetically enhance someone during life.
This would foster the common law values of informed consent
and decisional autonomy, as well as the constitutional right to
privacy.
Under the model statute upon which this Note is based,
parents' decisional authority would not be as severely restricted
if the genetic alterations were for the purpose of eliminating
incurable disease the child will develop, as it would if the al-
terations were made for other purposes. Parents are granted
great deference when making medical decisions on behalf of
their children. Eventually, genetic engineering will be regarded
58 See generally Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC.
R V. 487, 513-14 (1973) (arguing that removing children from their damaging fami-
lies may be beneficial despite inadequate state services).
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as a "treatment" for medicinally incurable diseases. As such, the
rights that parents already possess, with regard to authorizing
medically necessary treatment for their children, will persist as
technology advances.
V. COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS
Fundamental rights are not limitless. Compelling state in-
terests served by the least restrictive means can always confine
them.59 In the case of genetic enhancement, several counter-
vailing state interests present themselves as potential limitations
on the right to genetically enhance.
A. The Psychological Welfare of Children
Perhaps the strongest state interest raised by genetic engi-
neering is that the practice will result in psychological harm to
the resultant child. States have routinely been found to have a
compelling interest in the psychological welfare of their child
citizens in the context of pornography and First Amendment
challenges. 6° Psychological welfare is implicated by the child's
knowledge that he or she was designed as a product and manu-
factured, rather than created through a natural process.61 There
is the harmful awareness that the child's parent abused his or
her power to control the child's destiny.6
2
Fears of the eventual commodification of human beings re-
sulting in the bifurcation of children into desirables and unde-
sirables also exist.6 3 That the law disallows the sale of human
organs for transplant reflects distaste for the commodification of
59 See cases cited supra note 3.
60 See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(finding a ban on indecent telephone messages violated the First Amendment because
it did not employ the least restrictive means to protect the interests of children); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (upholding state statute making it
criminal for anyone to facilitate the making of pornographic material using children
under 16-years-old); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (acknowl-
edging the state's right to regulate for the well-being of children).
61 See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 643, 653 (1998) (ex-
plaining how cloning will disrupt family relationships).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 657 (cautioning that cloning values people as commercial ob-
jects).
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people. 64 Implicit in our jurisprudence disallowing the classifi-
cation of people as products is the notion that children not be
perceived (and not perceive themselves) as commodities. Simi-
larly, the law is likely to frown upon the formation of children
who are custom made much as a product one would buy ac-
cording to one's preferences.
Other commentators have suggested that genetic engineer-
ing will lead to "conditional parenting" where the traditional
concept of the parent-child relationship would dramatically
change to that of a child living out the possible self-serving
preferences of the parents. 65 While parents may currently at-
tempt to mold their children according to parental preferences,
children have the ability to refuse those preferences. Eventually,
a child can reject his parents' penchants and no longer be held
by them. In this context, and as most parents would want, this
child goes on to develop his own individual predilections,
which will be independent of those of his parents.
A genetically engineered child is likely to be psychologi-
cally harmed by the difficulty (or impossibility) in separating
her preferences, as an adult, from those her parents imposed by
manipulating her genome. The precise psychological harm in-
flicted is merely conjecture at this point because there are no
definitive data referencing the degree of influence genetics has
on our development. However, as the Human Genome Project
progresses, the answers will become more tangible. We already
attribute some emotional responses to the presence or absence
of certain neurotransmitters in the brain. For example, the lack
of a neurotransmitter can result in depression, which is currently
considered to have a genetic component. 66 Perhaps it is the
64 The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994),
bans the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration for use in human trans-
plantation. Since states have traditionally regulated organ donation, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968 to attend to differences among the states in their respective
organ donation and transplantation laws. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT (amended
1987), 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993). Like NOTA, the UAGA prohibits the sale or purchase
of human organs or tissue for transplantation purposes. Id. § 10, 8A U.L.A. 58. Every
state had adopted the UAGA outright, or something similar, by 1972. See Fred H.
Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CoRP. L. 69, 71 (1994).
65 See Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Proj-
ect and the Commodification of Self, 14 IssuEs L. & MED. 147, 158 (1998).
66 See Judy Silberg et al., The Influence of Genetic Factors and Life Stress on
Depression Among Adolescent Girls, 56 ARcHrvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 225, 230
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amount of this chemical that is genetically influenced. Mice
have been genetically engineered to have better memory, 67 and
our predisposition to certain weights has also been tied to ge-
netics.68 It is likely we will find, through continued genetic re-
search, that genetics plays a much greater part in who we are
and how we develop than previously thought or imagined. Ac-
cordingly, a genetically engineered child will be constrained by
the genome her parents chose. The child will become aware that
the "features" her parents ordered endure for a lifetime, poten-
tially influencing the development of her individuality. If sci-
ence reveals the extent of genetic control, the child will become
aware of particular aspects of her identity over which she has no
control since they are primarily governed by genetics. The abil-
ity to separate from her parents' preferences could not be ac-
complished and would thereby harm her psychological well
being.
B. Interest in Cultural Diversity
The early twentieth century was the forum for the Ameri-
can eugenics movement that sought to improve the human race
through technology. 69 During this time, such cases as Buck v.
Bell70 were decided in which the Court sanctioned involuntary
sterilization of the "feeble minded." In his now infamously of-
fensive opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reflected the
sentiments of the movement: "It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.... Three
generations of imbeciles are enough., 71 The Supreme Court
(1999) (concluding "long term stability of depression in pubertal girls is best ex-
plained by latent genetic factors").
67 See Faye Flam, Just How Smart Are These Mice?, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept.
14, 1999, at A10 (reporting on research with mice genetically engineered to have
enhanced brains).
" See Jeffrey M. Friedman, The Obesity Gene (visited Apr. 9, 2001)
<http://academy.d20.co.edu/kadets/lundberg/obesity.htm> (noting the discovery of
the gene that produces the protein leptin in human fat cells).
69 See John R. Harding, Jr., Comment, Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics
and the New Eugenics, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 471,477 (1991) (examining the implications
of using human genetic engineering for eugenic purposes).
70 274 U.S. 200, 200 (1927) (upholding Virginia statute that authorized
sexual sterilization of inmates in state institutions found to have a "hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility").
71 Id. at 207.
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later indirectly condemned the practice through its 1942 deci-
sion in Skinner v. Oklahoma declaring unconstitutional the
Oklahoma Habitual Sterilization Act, which allowed courts to
order the sterilization of those convicted for crimes involving
"moral turpitude. 72
Eugenics comes in two forms: positive and negative. Both
pose a threat to the genetic diversity of the population that is the
product of unmanipulated sexual reproduction. Negative
eugenics, the type that is currently most feasible and which was
practiced in the last century, aims to diminish or eradicate unde-
sirable genes in the gene pool.73 Certain forms of negative
eugenics have perpetuated in society with varying degrees of
controversy. 74 Amniocentesis makes prenatal diagnosis of dis-
ease or abnormalities possible, giving the mother an opportunity
to timely terminate the pregnancy if she desires. Additionally,
states regulate the degree of permissible relatedness between
persons who wish to marry.7  Conversely, positive eugenics
promotes purposeful selection, through technology, of those
traits that society deems attractive or superior.76 It is this latter
type of eugenics that parents wanting to genetically engineer
their child would be practicing. Negative eugenics focuses on
curbing the reproduction of those thought to be capable of
passing presumably undesirable heritable traits to offspring.
Unlike positive eugenics, in practice, procreation only between
the "well bred" still relies in part on the recombination of genes
that takes place during reproduction, thereby maintaining some
degree of randomness in the gene pool. As a form of positive
eugenics, genetic engineering results in significant manipulation
of a human genome after recombination. Therefore, the diver-
sity of the gene pool is more vulnerable to depletion, leading
more quickly to a genetically homogenous society. As our gene
pool becomes increasingly homogenous, we risk losing the di-
versity that allows our race to adapt so well to an ever-changing
environment.
72 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
73 See Leon R. Kass, Human Cloning Should Be Banned, in CLONING 26, 43
(Paul A. Winters ed., 1998) (arguing there is no principle to distinguish between the
legitimate and illegitimate uses of cloning).
74 See Harding, supra note 69, at 478 (showing that some forms of negative
eugenics, such as bans on incest, are widely accepted while positive eugenics still
carries negative post-war sentiment).
75 See id.76 See Kass, supra note 73, at 44.
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In recent years, courts have been willing to recognize a
state interest in maintaining the genetic diversity of plants and
animals.77 Extrapolation of this interest to apply to humans is
tempered, however, as the preservation of the genetic diversity
of plants and animals is largely motivated by the economic
gains humans realize from their harvest or capture.78 As dis-
cussed above, such commodification of humans would fly in the
face of our current value system, and therefore would not, as it
does with other organisms, be an appropriate ulterior justifica-
tion for preserving human genetic diversity. Yet, this difference
is not fatal to extending the interest in plant and animal diver-
sity to humans. In reference to the Endangered Species Act,
Congress has expressed that "it is in the best interests of man-
kind to minimize the losses of genetic variations.... They are
keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide an-
swers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask. 79
Surely, if such strong sentiment surrounds the preservation of
plant and animal diversity, the same would attach to human ge-
netic diversity. However, in the absence of established accep-
tance of such a notion, the combination of our interest in the
diversity in the genetics of other organisms, and for diversity in
our culture, may result in creating human genetic diversity as a
compelling interest.
There is an implied message of a value in promoting inte-
gration and diversity throughout society when the Court con-
demns a discriminatory act. Illustrations of this message can be
seen in the racial desegregation cases brought before the Su-
preme Court in the 1950s before the passage of the Civil Rights
Act.80 While decided on grounds of Equal Protection, there re-
mained recognition that racial integration would benefit black
and white students alike. Similarly, a fundamental right to en-
gage in association has been expressly held to exist by the Su-
77 See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that biodiversity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
78 See id. at 1052-53 (explaining that biodiversity produces products with
value for the market).
79 Committee Reports on the Endangered Species Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-412,
at 4-5 (1973).
80 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding "separate
but equal" unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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preme Court. 8' Protected under the First Amendment and linked
to the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause that "embraces
freedom of speech," the freedom to associate highlights the
worth in free exchange of ideas and beliefs with others.82
The culture of a nation is formed from the complex inter-
relation of individuals of various backgrounds, races, ethnici-
ties, and religions. As noted by Congress above, genetics may
hold the answers to questions we have not yet begun to formu-
late. In effect, merely knowing the sequence of the human ge-
nome is the tip of an iceberg that extends to unknown depths.
To an unidentified degree, the depletion of genetic diversity
may negatively affect our culture-something that has tradition-
ally been perceived as being beyond the scope of genetic influ-
ence. While not explicitly addressed in our nation's jurispru-
dence, a value of cultural diversity can be inferred from our in-
tolerance of discrimination under the law and the constitutional
protection of a freedom to associate in the name of intellectual
and spiritual exchange. Where the practice of genetic engineer-
ing threatens this belief, there exists the risk that pieces of our
cultural diversity will be lost. Accordingly, a state asserted in-
terest in maintaining cultural diversity would be considered
compelling, and thus allowed to limit parents' right to geneti-
cally enhance their children.
There exists a clash between state interests in children's
welfare, cultural and genetic diversity on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of parents to choose to genetically enhance
and make decisions for their children on the other. The most
logical body of law to which to turn for a solution is abortion
law as it is the only area that has dealt with the complex inter-
relation of state interests, fundamental rights, and the unborn.
Yet, while genetic engineering and abortion are common as to
the parties involved, fundamental differences between the two
issues render abortion law an inappropriate model.
81 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding
that the NAACP's members were free from forced disclosure of their affiliation with
that particular association).82 Id. at 460.
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VI. THE ABORTION MODEL AND VIABILITY
In the seminal abortion case, Roe v. Wade,83 Texas con-
tended that its interest in the protection of fetal life was com-
pelling throughout the pregnancy and therefore legitimized the
law's infringement on a woman's right to choose to carry a fe-
tus to term. Conversely, the woman and physician who brought
the case contended that a woman does have a right to abortion
that cannot be limited by any state interest in the fetus. But the
Supreme Court disagreed with Texas' sweeping characterization
of the status of its interest in fetal life and with the mother's
classification of her right to abortion. 84 Instead, the Court manu-
factured a temporal scheme using the trimesters of pregnancy as
markers for when certain state interests would become compel-
ling and could thereby limit a woman's fundamental right to
abortion. 8
5
The viability of the fetus, as defined through the trimesters
of pregnancy, became the fulcrum in the balance between the
right to abortion and the state interest in protecting fetal life and
the health of the mother.86 After viability, state interests in the
life of the fetus and the health of the mother become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the right to abortion. The
interests are compelling because the fetus is presumably capable
of meaningful life outside of the womb at viability. 87 The Court
relied on extensive history of abortion law and philosophy in its
determination of viability as the threshold, 88 and went on to
hold that after viability, the state "may go so far as to proscribe
8'410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973).
84 See id.
85 See id. at 164-65.
8 See id. at 163.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 130-47. The Court began its inquiry with a look at ancient civili-
zations' views toward abortion and the Hippocratic oath. Next, the court looked to
common law considerations, which determined that an abortion performed before
"quickening" (the first detectable movements of the fetus in the womb) was not an
indictable offense. This view arose from early philosophical, theological, and legal
concepts which held that life did not begin until the fetus become "formed" or "in-
fused with a 'soul' or 'animated."' In 1803, English statutory law made abortion of a
quickened fetus a capital offense. Pre-quickening abortions were considered lesser
offenses. English law carved out the exception legalizing abortions performed to
preserve the life and health of the mother. By the 1950s, American law had phased
out the quickening provision and banned abortion at any stage of pregnancy, except
to save the life or health of the mother. Id.
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abortion ... except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother., 8
9
In balancing the state's interests against a woman's right to
abort her fetus, the Court refused to adopt Texas' view that a
fetus was a person and therefore entitled to constitutional pro-
tection from deprivation of life without due process of law pro-
vided by the Due Process Clause. The Court instead concluded
that where the Constitution refers to a "person," "the use of the
word is such that it has application only postnatally. [Nothing in
the writing itself] indicates, with any assurance, that it has any
possible pre-natal application." 90 More specifically, the use of
the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not in-
clude fetuses. 9
1
Roe's trimester approach left the decision to abort to the
pregnant woman's physician during the first trimester of preg-
nancy. 92 At the beginning of the second trimester, the state's
interest in preserving the health of the mother becomes compel-
ling, allowing it to regulate abortions, so long as such regula-
tions are reasonably related to maternal health. 93 As the preg-
nancy enters the third trimester, under the presumption that vi-
ability begins here, the state can promote "its interest in the po-
tentiality of human life" by regulating or proscribing abortion
altogether, except to preserve the life or health of the mother.
94
The trimester model remained in place until Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey, in which the Court evaluated the constitution-
ality of a Pennsylvania statute that sought to limit a woman's
access to abortions. In a plurality opinion, it narrowly upheld
Roe's essential holding that (1) a woman has a right to abort
before viability and to obtain an abortion without undue inter-
ference from the state; (2) the state can restrict abortions after
fetal viability; and (3) the state's interests in the health of the
woman and life of the fetus are continuous. 95 However, the ad-
vances in medicine that occurred between 1972 and 1992 forced
89 Id. at 163-64.
90Id. at 157.
91 See id. at 157-58 (concluding that "person" only refers to post-natal be-
ings). 92 See id. at 164 (holding that the decision to abort must be left in the hands of
the mother's physician).
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
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the abandonment of the trimester framework. Namely, abortions
could be performed more safely later in pregnancy in 1992 and
better neonatal care was bringing the point of viability closer to
conception. Justice O'Connor expressed doubts concerning the
longevity of the trimester approach when she noted that it was
"on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks
of... abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the state
may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further
forward to actual childbirth. As medical science becomes better
able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point
of viability is moved further back toward conception." 96 Yet,
even abandoning Roe's trimester approach the Court was unam-
biguous in upholding viability as the marker of the earliest point
at which the state's interest in fetal life is sufficiently compel-
ling to limit a woman's right to choose an abortion.
In both Roe and Casey, the Court relied on viability rather
than recognizing a fetus as a person with the associated consti-
tutional rights. Had it done so, abortion would deprive a fetus of
life without due process, in contravention of constitutional re-
quirements, thereby potentially rendering the termination of a
pregnancy a murder. The Court's justification for not recogniz-
ing fetal personhood is that the Constitution offers no overt in-
dication that the word "person" applies prenatally. 97 This rea-
soning corresponds with the Originalist approach to constitu-
tional interpretation, which advocates a strict reading of the
Constitution in accordance with the ideas that are stated ex-
pressly or are unambiguously implicit in the document itself.9
8
That is not to say the Court has so restricted itself in all situa-
tions. In other cases, the Court has turned to Nonoriginalist
views, instructing courts to look beyond what is merely the
written word, as was done in finding our fundamental right to
96 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458
(1983). See generally John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human
Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53
U. CGI. L. REv. 1274 (1986) (exploring the constitutional ramifications of regulating
positive genetic engineering, as well as examining a philosophical approach to the
issues).
97 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
98 See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND Poucins
§ 1.4, at 17 (1997) (explaining the debate between Originalist and Nonoriginalist
interpretations of the Constitution).
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privacy.99 The jurisprudential theory behind the Court's finding
is beyond the scope of this Note. However, suffice it to say that
the Court continues to uphold the view that abortion law will
not recognize a fetus as a person and therefore does not accord
it constitutional rights. 1°° Viability has thus become the fulcrum
in the balance between state interests and the right to abortion.
Before viability, the scales tip in favor of the mother's right
to choose abortion and state interests are not sufficient to in-
fringe upon that right. 10 1 After viability, the weight of the bal-
ance shifts and the state's interests in the life of the fetus and
health of the mother become compelling enough to override the
right to abort. 10 2 If the mother chooses to exercise her right, the
result will be the death of the fetus. On the other hand, when
state interests control, the result is typically life. Therefore, the
use of viability is arguably appropriate because the issue of
abortion deals with a clear separation in result. The logical bal-
ancing point would be where the fetus' life could likely be sus-
tained outside of the womb-hence, viability.
VII. GENETIC ENGINEERING
Both genetic engineering and abortion deal with reproduc-
tive rights, potentially restrictive state interests, and a fetus, all
of which are unique to issues of reproduction. When deciding
future cases pertaining to human genetic engineering, the courts
will look to establish a legal paradigm that can be used to
evaluate subsequent cases. This Note urges that the similarities
between abortion law and genetic engineering are not sufficient
to overcome the differences, leaving little reason to blindly im-
port the established abortion model into the new legal arena of
human genetic engineering. While both issues generally involve
reproductive rights, the specific rights implicated in each are
different-one involves the right to not procreate and the other,
the right to genetically engineer a fetus. This being the case,
viability is not relevant to the balance between a right to cus-
tomize one's children and the associated state interests. Moreo-
99 See id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe, 410
U.S. at 152-53 (reviewing the development of the right to privacy); Casey, 505 U.S.
at 846-53 (each explaining the derivation of the right to privacy).
'00 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-62 (discussing
that a fetus does not have the rights of a person).
10 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
102 See id.
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ver, viability is not a suitable reference point to demarcate this
balance since the harm to the fetus has been done long before
that point.
A. Different Rights
The clash between a woman's right to abort and the state's
interest in preserving life is unique to abortion law. Roe and its
progeny narrowed their holdings on the unique question of
whether a woman has a fundamental right to "bear or beget a
child" and when that right can be truncated or eliminated.10
3
Yet, regulation of human genetic engineering does not chal-
lenge a woman's ability to seek or to have an abortion, nor does
it have to do with the decision of whether to have a child. It is
limited to the decision of what type of child the parents would
like to have.
B. Viability Is Not Relevant to the Balance of Interests and
Rights in Genetic Engineering
The abortion model cannot be adapted, for use as a legal
tool, to analyze genetic engineering because viability, on which
abortion law depends, is not relevant to the unique balance of
state interests and the right to customize one's children that ge-
netic engineering presents. On one side of the scale, the state's
interests in the welfare of children and cultural and genetic di-
versity are not dependent upon viability to raise them to a com-
pelling level. As argued earlier, these interests are compelling at
any stage in the pregnancy, and therefore, do not require some
outside factor, such as viability, in order to be included in the
equation. On the other side of the scale, parents who wish to
genetically alter their child are not deciding the question of
whether they can have a child. That decision has already been
made and they are proceeding to the next step-deciding what
type of child they would like. Viability plays no role in that de-
cision. If genetic engineering is to take place, it will be done
long before viability. And once it is done, viability will become
just one of many points on the pregnancy calendar for the
woman carrying the genetically altered fetus to term.
103 See id. at 851 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); see
also Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (describing the trimester framework regulating the
abortion right).
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If viability were used to decide the balance, the right to ge-
netically enhance would go unchecked since the state's interests
could not enter the equation until after the fact. Fundamental
rights are given the utmost protection under the law but are not
unlimited. The unfaltering rule is that these rights can only be
impinged upon by means that are narrowly tailored to achieving
a compelling state interest. One legislative function is to curb
certain conduct by creating laws that aim to first prevent the
behavior, and second, to punish those who violate the law. By
analogy, a viability-dependent evaluation would leave states
only able to punish those who have already performed genetic
engineering, rather than allowing them to curb the practice be-
fore it happens by way of compelling interests. Unlike an abor-
tion that can be performed both before and after the fetus is
considered viable, genetic engineering could only be accom-
plished months before viability. If we adopt the abortion
framework and its dependence upon viability, parents will have
already genetically enhanced their children, long before the
state's interests even have a chance of being served. The point
at which state interests become compelling must go hand in
hand with the point at which the harm occurs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Abortion law was developed to manage the complex inter-
relation between the state, a fetus, and the mother. Yet the
similarity between the parties involved in abortion and in ge-
netic enhancement cases is insufficient justification to warrant
the import of the abortion model to evaluate genetic engineer-
ing. Abortion law deals with a right not to procreate. 1 4 Con-
versely, genetic enhancement involves a right to customize
one's children that is likely to be deemed fundamental as it in-
volves a right to privacy, which has already been accorded con-
stitutional protection. Unlike the right to abortion, evaluation of
the right to choose how one procreates is not dependent upon
viability as the point at which state interests become sufficiently
compelling to limit the right. Genetic enhancement takes place
long before viability. If used as a marker in the pregnancy, to
identify where the state's interest in the fetus becomes compel-
ling, the harm will have already occurred and the right to ge-
'0o See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (presenting argument that abortion right stems
from law on the right to privacy and procreation).
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netically enhance one's offspring will be effectively unre-
stricted. As such, the use of viability in a genetic engineering
evaluation is inappropriate.
Further, abortion and genetic engineering involve dissimi-
lar state interests that are served differently by the use of vi-
ability. A woman's choice to abort her pregnancy results in the
death of the fetus. Arguably, it is logical that once that fetus has
a realistic chance for survival outside of the womb, the state's
interest in that potential life is raised to a compelling level
where the choice to abort can be overridden. Such is not the
case with genetic engineering, where a decision to genetically
enhance a pre-embryo does not involve the choice of whether or
not to have a child. The state's interest is not in preserving the
life of the fetus; rather, the concern is with the psychological
well being of the future child. Viability is not a factor that af-
fects an interest in psychological wellness.
Finally, genetic engineering poses a threat to state interests
such as cultural and genetic diversity. The abortion model was
not created to handle interests that extend beyond the immediate
concerns for a woman's health and life of a fetus. The abortion
model is workable only in its own context and it does not ap-
propriately address the balance of interests and rights involved
when parents choose to genetically enhance their children.

